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Abstract 
Inner speech travels under many aliases:  the inner voice, verbal thought, thinking in words, internal 
verbalization, “talking in your head,” the “little voice in the head,” and so on.  It is both a familiar 
element of first-person experience and a psychological phenomenon whose complex cognitive 
components and distributed neural bases are increasingly well understood.  There is evidence that 
inner speech plays a variety of cognitive roles, from enabling abstract thought, to supporting 
metacognition, memory, and executive function.  One active area of controversy concerns the 
relation of inner speech to auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia, with a common proposal 
being that sufferers of AVH misidentify their own inner speech as being generated by someone else.  
Recently, researchers have used artificial intelligence to translate the neural and neuromuscular 
signatures of inner speech into corresponding outer speech signals, laying the groundwork for a 
variety of new applications and interventions. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Inner speech lies at the busy crossroads of several active research programs in cognitive science.  
Thought and language appear together in a single phenomenon of “thinking in words” or “verbal 
thought”—one implicated in working memory, metacognition, abstract thought, executive control, 
auditory verbal hallucinations, and much more.    
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While inner speech has long attracted attention from philosophers and theoretically-minded 
psychologists (Bain, 1855; Broca, 1861; Lordat, 1843; Sokolov, 1972; Vygotsky, 2012/1962), advances 
in neuroimaging over the last thirty years have helped to make it a more tractable phenomenon for 
scientific study.  The idea—promoted most prominently by Vygotsky—that inner speech is the 
controlled, internal reuse of a capacity that first manifests in the form of overt speech remains a 
powerful current in some contemporary research.  (For other early roots of this idea, see also Cooley 
(1992) and Piaget (1923)).  However, much work on inner speech now extends well beyond that 
tradition into the more general territory of the relation of language to thought.  For some, 
understanding inner speech amounts to grasping the deepest cognitive divide between humans and 
non-verbal animals (Frankish, 2018; Gauker, 2011; Paivio, 1990).  Others highlight inner speech’s 
close connection to perception and motor control as a means to grounding so-called “higher” or 
“abstract” forms of thought in perceptual and motor capacities found across the animal kingdom 
(Clark, 1998; Dove, 2014).  Within cognitive neuropsychology, inner speech has played a central role 
in influential theories of auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia (Frith, 1992; Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2007c; Langland-Hassan, 2008; Shergill, 2003; Wu, 2012). 
What may appear, introspectively, to be a unitary phenomenon—the “voice in the head”—is now 
commonly seen as a multi-component process with dissociable stages or parts.  Current research 
focuses on understanding the interrelation of those parts and their roles in supporting other 
cognitive processes and abilities, and in explaining psychiatric phenomena such as auditory verbal 
hallucinations.  This Overview summarizes the central questions and emerging conclusions of that 
research.  Other overviews of this landscape aimed at an interdisciplinary audience in cognitive 
science can be found in Alderson-Day and Fernyhough (2015), Perrone-Bertolotti et al. (2014) and in 
the interdisciplinary volume edited by Langland-Hassan and Vicente (2018). 
 2.  WHAT IS MEANT BY ‘INNER SPEECH’? 
Despite the increasing amount of research conducted on inner speech, it can be difficult to 
characterize the phenomenon in a theory-neutral way.  What is it that competing theories of inner 
speech all seek to explain or shed light upon?  Unlike some notions in cognitive science—such as 
(perhaps) working memory (Baddeley, 1994)—the term inner speech lacks a commonly agreed 
operational definition.  There is no outward behaviour, or pattern of stimuli and responses, that is 
simply equivalent to exercising inner speech. Nor is inner speech commonly viewed as a 
psychological “posit,” put forward to explain specific behaviours or experimental results.  In this way 
inner speech is unlike folk psychological states such as belief, desire, and intention, which, for many 
in cognitive science, are treated as theoretical posits—elements of a “theory of mind” whose 
ontological commitments are vindicated by the power of the theory they appear in to predict and 
explain human behaviour (Chihara & Fodor, 1965; Dennett, 1991; Fodor, 1987; Sellars, 1956).   
Instead, inner speech first appears on the scene as an introspectively salient component of everyday 
experience.  We gesture at it with phrases such as “the little voice in the head,” or “talking to oneself 
silently.”  In this way, ‘inner speech’ is perhaps like ‘mental imagery.’ One can use the term to mark 
an introspectively salient phenomenon, while allowing for scientific disagreements about its 
ultimate nature (Block, 1981; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006; Pylyshyn, 2002).   
To linger a moment on this important point, let us look closely at an influential attempt at a more 
formal definition of inner speech—though one that still aims at theoretical neutrality.  In an 
extensive review paper, Alderson-Day and Fernyhough (2015) propose that inner speech can be 
defined as “the subjective experience of language in the absence of overt and audible articulation” 
(2015, p. 1).  Grandchamp et al. (2019, p. 2) endorse this definition as well, adjusting it slightly to:  
“the subjective experience of verbalization in the absence of overt articulation or sign.”  These 
definitions—with their appeal to “subjective experience”—highlight inner speech’s close connection 
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to introspection and first-person experience.  Nevertheless, most in cognitive science—including 
Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, and Grandchamp et al.—do not assume that inner speech must occur 
consciously, nor that it must involve some attending “subjective experience.”  And, certainly, when it 
comes to characterizing the phenomenon in a theory-neutral way, it should not be assumed that 
inner speech must always have an attending “subjective experience.”  
Suppose, then, that we remove “subjective experience” from Alderson-Day and Fernyhough’s 
definition.  We are left with: inner speech is language in the absence of overt and audible 
articulation.  Now, strictly speaking, what you are reading—these very words on the page—are 
instances of language in the absence of overt and audible articulation.  So it seems we should specify 
that inner speech is inner language—in the sense of being internal to the mind—that occurs in the 
absence of overt articulation.  That gives us:  inner speech is inner language in the absence of overt 
and audible articulation.  This is similar to the definition offered by Oppenheim and Dell, who 
propose that inner speech is “typically characterized as either the activation of abstract linguistic 
representations or a detailed articulatory simulation that lacks only the production of sound” (2010, 
p. 1147).  And yet, we should leave open the possibility that inner speech can also occur 
simultaneously with overt articulation.  For it may be that as we talk aloud we are also talking in the 
head; and, indeed, a number of current theories, which see inner speech as a component of outer-
speech prediction and monitoring, hold this to be so (Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014; Pickering & 
Garrod, 2013; Postma, 2000).  Adjusting our definitions again to remove the suggestion that inner 
speech cannot occur at the same time as outer speech, we are left with:  inner speech is inner 
language.  (Or, adjusting Oppenheim and Dell’s definition:  inner speech is the activation of abstract 
linguistic representations.)  It is not clear that these characterizations move us forward from “the 
little voice in the head.”  Worse, they seem to suggest that ‘inner speech’ is simply a catchall phrase 
for any linguistic processing at all.  We have taken a wrong turn—but where? 
The problem is not with Alderson-Day and Fernyhough’s or Oppenheim and Dell’s characterizations 
of inner speech, but with the attempt to treat them as formal definitions or theories of inner speech.  
We should instead see them as rough-and-ready attempts to point at a phenomenon we would like 
to better understand, by noting some of its salient and common features:  inner speech is a kind of 
mental use of language, or simulation of speaking, that, often enough, occurs consciously and in the 
absence of any overt articulation.  Which, if any, of the features so-noted are essential to inner 
speech can be left open.  We can imagine ourselves in the position of ornithologists who have on 
occasion caught sight of what looks to be a new species of bird.  We can give the species a name and 
list the salient features we use to identify it, while leaving open to scientific investigation such 
questions as whether the birds so named really form a single species, whether each of its members 
has all (or only some) of the features we have used to identify them, and so on.  Disagreements can 
be expected concerning borderline cases, as is common when rigorous theorizing and 
experimentation has begun.   
Whether inner speech continues to be a useful construct to cognitive science will depend upon 
whether the subset of linguistic processing picked out by the term ‘inner speech’ constitutes an 
explanatorily useful kind.  A possibility to bear in mind is that fragmentation will occur within that 
subset itself, such that theorists find it useful to posit distinct kinds of inner speech.  At that point we 
again need to ask what it is that unites them all as kinds of inner speech, as opposed to language-
related cognition generally.  Nevertheless, despite this possibility of fragmentation, there are 
reasons (explored below) for thinking that inner speech’s close relationship to first-person 
experience and introspection will in fact increase the chances that it remains an explanatorily useful 
kind.  The fact that people can consciously control and report upon their own inner speech (in 
contrast to some other forms of linguistic processing) enables it to serve as a lever for therapeutic 
interventions, the development of new technologies, and further scientific theorizing.   
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3. METHODS FOR INVESTIGATING INNER SPEECH 
There are many strategies for eliciting and measuring inner speech.  Often two or more methods are 
used in collaboration.  For instance,  a task presumed to rely upon inner speech—such as silently 
judging whether two words rhyme—may be combined with simultaneous neuroimaging to locate 
the neural substrate of inner speech (Geva, Jones, et al., 2011b).  With a theory of the neural bases 
for inner speech in hand, neuroimaging can then be conducted on a population of interest—such as 
those suffering from auditory verbal hallucinations—to see whether activations associated with 
inner speech occur when AVHs are reported (Di Biase et al., 2019; McGuire et al., 1995; Shergill, 
2003; Simons et al., 2010).   Such imagining can also be used in tandem with subjective 
questionnaires that query a variety of qualitative and phenomenological features of inner speech, to 
explore the neural variations corresponding to variations in how inner speech appears to subjects 
from the first person perspective (Alderson-Day, Mitrenga, Wilkinson, McCarthy-Jones, & 
Fernyhough, 2018; Grandchamp et al., 2019; Kühn, Fernyhough, Alderson-Day, & Hurlburt, 2014; 
McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011).    
Having noted the value of combining methods in this area, we can look in more detail at a variety of 
individual means for eliciting and studying inner speech.  
3.1  Introspection: structured interviews, surveys, and self-reports 
A person’s introspective access to their own inner speech can be exploited as a means to gathering 
information about its nature and function (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2014; Morin, 2018).  One 
approach to doing so is the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) paradigm, developed by Hurlburt 
and colleagues (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Participants in DES studies go 
about their daily activities while wearing a portable beeper that emits a beep at random (roughly 15 
minute) intervals, after which they are to take notes on the thoughts, emotions, images, and other 
mental phenomenal that populated their conscious experience immediately prior to the beep.  The 
paradigm’s aim is to allow one to “sneak up on” oneself, so to speak, and, in so doing, decrease the 
likelihood that reports about the nature of one’s conscious experience will be influenced by 
background theoretical beliefs and expectations.   
In one application, the DES paradigm was used to assess the frequency of inner speech across a 
population, simply by analysing the percentage of “beep” reports where forms of inner speech were 
described.  Data from one such DES study were used to arrive at a frequently-cited statistic that 
inner speech occurs, on average, during 25% of waking life—though it bears noting that individual 
reports vary widely, with some participants reporting that inner speech occurs nearly all the time 
and others rarely (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). 
More controversially, DES has been used to taxonomize and discriminate different forms of inner 
speech.  For instance, in addition to inner speaking, Hurlburt et al. cite results from DES studies in 
support of countenancing comparatively recondite phenomena such as “unworded inner speech”—
i.e., the experience of inner speaking without the experience of words—and “unsymbolized 
thinking”—i.e., the experience of thinking without the subjective presence of any related sensory 
feature or symbolic structure.  Further, they propose a strict distinction between inner speaking and 
the inner hearing of oneself speaking.  In a development that could help to validate such 
distinctions, DES has been used in combination with neuroimaging (R.T. Hurlburt, B. Alderson-Day, 
Simone Kühn, & C. Fernyhough, 2016b; Kühn et al., 2014).  In one study, experimenters found that 
“spontaneous” inner speech—as detected by DES—had significantly different neural correlates from 
the kinds of inner speech elicited by some common behavioural measures (Hurlburt et al., 2016b).  
In another study, neuroimaging differences were found corresponding to differences in DES reports 
of inner speaking versus inner hearing (Kühn et al., 2014).   
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Other broadly introspective means for assessing inner speech involve the use of structured 
questionnaires, such as the Self Talk Inventory (STI; Burnett, 1996), the Self-Talk Use Questionnarie 
(STUQ; Hardy, Hall & Hardy, 2005), and the Self Talk Scale (STS; Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009).  
More recently, the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire (VISQ) (McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 
2011) and the VISQ-R (Alderson-Day et al., 2018) have taken specific aim at distinguishing different 
forms of inner speech.  Inspired by Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) developmental theory of inner speech, 
the VISQ asks participants to rate the phenomenological properties of their inner speech according 
to four factors: dialogicality (the extent to which inner speech occurs as a back-and-forth 
conversation), the evaluative or motivational force of the inner speech, whether the “voices” of 
others occur in one’s inner speech, and the degree of “condensation” of inner speech (i.e. the extent 
to which sentences are abbreviated in inner speech, while their meaning appears retained) 
(McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011).  Several studies have used the VISQ and VISQ-R to 
statistically link reported features of inner speech to psychiatric conditions, including anxiety, 
depression, hallucination-proneness, and self-esteem  (Alderson-Day et al., 2014; de Sousa, 
Sellwood, Spray, Fernyhough, & Bentall, 2016). 
 
Other recently developed subjective assessment tools include the Nevada Inner Experience 
Questionnaire (Heavey et al., 2019) and the Internal Representations Questionnaire (IRQ) (Roebuck 
& Lupyan, 2020).  Many of these tools have distinct aims and foci, making their results difficult to 
compare.  For instance, whereas the questions on the VISQ-R aim to uncover different forms of inner 
speech, the IRQ seeks to shed light on the propensity of individuals to use inner speech in problem 
solving not related to interpersonal communication.  Roebuck and Lupyan (2020) found correlations 
between the propensity to generate internal verbalizations (as measured by the IRQ) and 
performance on objective matching tasks that probed the influence of semantic and phonological 
features on response times. 
 
3.2  Behavioural Measures 
Even if there are no outward behaviours that can be taken as strictly equivalent to engaging in inner 
speech, there are many that are considered strong evidence for the active use of inner speech.  For 
instance, the ability to silently judge whether two written words rhyme, or whether two words are 
homophones, is standardly taken as good evidence for intact inner speech (Geva, Bennett, 
Warburton, & Patterson, 2011; Langland-Hassan, Faries, Richardson, & Dietz, 2015).  Such studies 
intermix word pairs that rhyme despite having dissimilar spellings (e.g., ‘eye’ and ‘tie’) and that have 
similar spellings while not rhyming (e.g. ‘wood’ and ‘blood’), to assure that participants cannot show 
competence through a visual strategy.  A related measure is to ask participants to silently count the 
number of syllables in a word (Levine, Calvanio, & Popovics, 1982), though this is potentially 
confounded by the general difficulty many have in counting syllables correctly.   
Abilities in these tasks are standardly taken as indirect measures of general inner speech capacities.  
For instance, when people with aphasia are shown to have difficulty judging rhymes silently, this can 
be taken as evidence that their outer speech deficits are mirrored by inner speech deficits (Geva, 
Bennett, et al., 2011; Langland-Hassan et al., 2015; Stark, Geva, & Warburton, 2017).  Note, 
however, that some studies have shown an imperfect correlation between inner and outer speech 
abilities in people with aphasia (Geva, Jones, et al., 2011a; Levine et al., 1982).   The precise 
relationship between the two—and the extent to which one may be better preserved than the other 
in people with aphasia—remains a matter of ongoing investigation (Fama, Hayward, Snider, 
Friedman, & Turkeltaub, 2017; Fama et al., 2019; Stark et al., 2017). 
It is worth reflecting on potential confounds in using silent rhyming tasks as assessments of inner 
speech abilities, as doing so raises interesting questions about what we should take inner speech to 
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be.  First, it is possible that one might generate words internally but simply have difficulties in 
judging whether they rhyme.  Arguably, this would not be an impairment in inner speech per se, but 
rather in judging rhymes.  Steps should therefore be taken to ensure that a deficit in silently rhyming 
is not simply a deficit in judging rhymes generally by, for instance, asking participants to judge 
rhymes presented to them aloud (Langland-Hassan et al., 2015).  A problem, however, is that even 
listening to words—one after the other—so as to judge whether they rhyme may require quickly 
repeating the words back to oneself; such self-generated repetition could itself be considered a form 
of inner speech.  In that case, it becomes difficult to distinguish the ability to judge rhymes from the 
ability to generate inner speech.  A possible response here is that holding an aurally perceived word 
or phrase in working memory is not equivalent to generating that word or phrase in inner speech—
perhaps on the grounds that a mental episode is only inner speech when it results from one’s own 
articulatory intentions.  As a related matter, we should consider the possibility that a population 
with impaired working memory might be capable of generating inner speech, yet incapable of 
“holding” such episodes in mind long enough to reflect on whether one internally generated word 
rhymes with another.  This raises the question—still open—of whether inner speech itself can occur 
in the absence of the ability to hold and reflect upon it in working memory, or whether, instead, the 
lack of an ability to intentionally maintain internally generated verbal utterances in mind should be 
seen as the lack of inner speech itself.   
Another feature of these methods for eliciting and assessing inner speech worth flagging is that they 
assume inner speech to carry phonetic information about the sounds of words.  Some argue that 
“condensed” or “impoverished” versions of inner speech are common and that these either fail to 
carry such information, or that do so only in a diminished sense (Fernyhough, 2004; Oppenheim & 
Dell, 2010; Vicente & Jorba, 2019).  If this is correct, then behavioural measures that assume inner 
speech to necessarily have a strong auditory-phonological component are only suitable for the study 
of a sub-set of all inner speech episodes.  Moreover, researchers seeking to build on Levelt’s (1989) 
influential model of speech production typically identify several distinct stages of inner speech 
generation—distinguishing representation of the semantic “message” to be communicated from 
elements such as the syntactic frame, phonemic structure, and articulatory plan (Grandchamp et al., 
2019; Vicente & Jorba, 2019).  They may hold that silent rhyming taxes a relatively late stage of inner 
speech—one richer than the day to day voice in the head that isn’t fixated on rhyme judgments.  
Though see Langland-Hassan (2018) for an argument that all inner speech episodes do indeed have 
an auditory-phonological component. 
A last hybrid method for assessing inner speech that has proven influential is to ask participants to 
repeat words—especially “tongue-twisters”—in the head and to ask them to indicate when they 
make inner-pronunciation errors (Oppenheim & Dell, 2008).  On the basis of such results, 
Oppenheim and Dell conclude that inner speech is “impoverished at the featural level” compared to 
overt speech (2008, p. 536).  This is classified as a hybrid method here because it involves both a 
(behavioural) inner speech eliciting task (repeating “tongue-twisters,” silently) and introspective 
judgments, on the part of participants, about features of their own inner speech.    
3.3  Neuroimaging  
Neuroimagining has been used with increasing success to locate the neural networks responsible for 
inner speech (Geva, 2018b; Hurlburt et al., 2016b; Loevenbruck, Grandchamp, Rapin, Nalborczyk, & 
Dohen, 2018; P. K. McGuire et al., 1996b; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014).  Such studies typically 
incorporate two means for detecting inner speech simultaneously.  In some versions, participants 
are simply asked to repeat words or phrases silently, “in the head” during scanning (P. K. McGuire et 
al., 1996b).  In any such paradigm, participants are trusted to generate (and therefore detect) their 
own inner speech at the same time that the imaging device (fMRI or PET, typically) is used to detect 
7 
 
related neural activity.  Alternatively, participants may be given a task assumed to require inner 
speech, such as judging rhymes silently (Geva, Jones, et al., 2011b), or reading silently (Yao, Belin, & 
Scheepers, 2011), while scanning takes place.   
The first method—asking participants to simply generate inner speech on their own—has the 
limitation that it presumes participants know what inner speech is and that they know when they 
are--or are not—generating it.  This may not seem problematic if we are simply interested in the 
neural correlates of carefully repeating a sentence in one’s head.  However, questions can be raised 
about whether such methods provide an adequate means for discovering the neural correlates of 
other kinds of inner speech that may occur “in the wild”—i.e., outside of experimental contexts—
which some researchers (especially followers of Vygotsky (2012/1962)) hypothesize is more 
“condensed” or abbreviated in nature, leaving out auditory, phonological, and syntactic elements 
(Grandchamp et al., 2019; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a).  It also rules out the study of any forms of 
inner speech that we are not well-suited to introspectively detect.  The second method—conducting 
neuroimaging during a concurrent task presumed to require inner speech—has the above-noted 
limitation that the task used to elicit inner speech may exploit only one aspect of inner speech, or 
only one type of inner speech.   
4. THE COMPONENTS OF INNER SPEECH 
Inner speech appears initially, to introspection, to be a unitary phenomenon: a single voice in the 
head without obvious parts or components (other than the distinct words that make up an inner 
utterance).  But a moment’s reflection shows this picture to be too simple.  Typically, when we say 
something in the head—e.g., “Remember bananas, baking soda, and whipped cream…”—there is an 
auditory-phonological component to the state.  We are aware not just of the semantic content (or 
meaning) of the episode; we are also, in some sense, aware of the sounds or phonemes of the 
relevant words. Such auditory elements account for the difference between saying a phrase in one’s 
head with an American as opposed to British accent, for example.  And they also account for the 
usefulness of inner speech to judgments concerning rhymes and homonyms which are, at bottom, 
auditory judgments.  These auditory-phonological features contrast to the semantic features, which 
are what we can think of as the meaning of the phrase.  Two inner speech utterances in distinct 
languages—‘It is snowing’ and ‘ll neige’, for example—might have the same semantics yet quite 
different auditory-phonological characteristics.  And while the auditory-phonological component and 
semantic component of an inner speech episode are perhaps the most obvious elements that 
combine in ordinary inner speech, there are likely others.  For instance, it may be that there is a 
separate articulatory component to inner speech—a representation or simulation of the kinds of lip, 
tongue, and throat movements necessary for the corresponding overt utterance (Loevenbruck et al., 
2018).  The precise number and nature of the components of inner speech—and their 
interrelation—is an active area of research.   
An important question in this vicinity is whether inner speech itself is to be considered an amalgam 
of these associated components or, rather, should be identified with just one of them.  Jackendoff 
(1996) can be read as proposing that inner speech proper—i.e., the voice in the head that “never 
shuts up” (p. 10)—should be identified with the auditory-phonological component alone.  Thought 
itself, for Jackendoff, remains unconscious, occurring in an amodal symbolic format.  “We become 
aware of thought taking place – we catch ourselves in the act of thinking,” Jackendoff explains, “only 
when it manifests itself in linguistic form” (1996, p. 10).  And yet, for Jackendoff, this linguistic form 
itself lacks the semantics of thought—otherwise it would simply be thought.  
Gauker (2011, 2018) defends a contrasting view, arguing that inner speech itself ought not to be 
confused with “auditory verbal imagery.”  Just as we distinguish between our auditory perception of 
another’s speech and that speech itself, he proposes, we should distinguish between the 
8 
 
representation of our own inner speech—which takes place through the use of auditory verbal 
imagery—and inner speech itself, which lacks any sensory component.  On Gauker’s view, inner 
speech is amodal (i.e., non-sensory) in nature.  However, unlike some more traditional views, such as 
Fodor’s (1975), where amodal mental representations occur in a proprietary language of thought, 
Gauker holds that inner speech is both amodal and occurs in our spoken, “natural” languages.   
Certain neural states, on his view, are also symbols of English sentences, though the symbols do not 
have or represent any auditory-phonological properties.  On his view, inner speech occurs (in an 
English speaker) when neural states of the sort that realize symbols of English are activated in a 
relevant sequence.  An interesting theoretical question raised by this proposal is: in virtue of what 
does a sequence of meaningful symbols—realized in the brain, or anywhere else—count as symbols 
of one natural language, as opposed to another, once they have been divorced from the 
phonological (and graphic) features distinctive of that language?   
A reviewer proposes, in response to this question, that it could be in virtue of the symbols being 
“amodal yet language-specific.”  However, the challenge remains to say what qualifies an amodal 
symbol as being specific to one language as opposed to another.  To this end, it is worth considering 
a distinction put forward by many linguists between a phoneme and a phone.  Phones are sometimes 
described as “concrete” sounds events—having a duration, spatial location, and so on—whereas 
phonemes are described as amodal “abstractions” over phones, such that a phoneme is a set of 
phones that tend to be heard as the same linguistic building-block.  Whereas changing a phoneme in 
a word changes the word’s meaning, altering a phone may not. (Two phones heard as the same 
phoneme are called allophones.) Up to this point we have simply of spoken “auditory-phonological” 
representations without distinguishing phones from phonemes, as the relationship between mental 
representations, on the one hand, and the phone/phoneme distinction, on the other, is vexed and 
underexplored.  However, it may nevertheless seem that, while the mental representation of phones 
must involve representing auditory features, and thus involve sensory representations of some kind, 
the representation of more abstract phonemes may be amodal in nature.  If that were right, 
representations of phonemes could then be said to be both amodal and language-specific, as 
phonemes are indeed the most basic building-blocks of a particular language relevant to 
distinguishing one word from another (there are 44 in English).  However, on this interpretation of 
phonemes as amodal, the point remains that representations of phonemes would lack the semantics 
of the ordinary words of a natural language; for representations of phonemes still concern 
(abstractions over) sounds; thus they would not have the kind of informational content we typically 
attribute to ordinary words.  We can thus re-pose the question that ended last paragraph as:  what 
would qualify a set of symbols with natural-language-like meanings as being symbols of one 
language, as opposed to another, when those symbols occur distinct from any representations of the 
phones, phonemes, graphemes, and articulatory plans distinctive of the language?    
 
Returning to the question of how to understand the relation among the components of inner 
speech, other theorists seek a middle ground where inner speech has both semantic and auditory-
phonological features essentially.  Carruthers (2011, 2018) argues that the auditory-phonological 
and semantic features of inner speech, while distinct, are “bound into” each other in roughly the 
way in which, in visual perception, the shape and colour properties of an object are “bound into” a 
single visual perception of an object, despite being processed in separate areas of visual cortex.  
Langland-Hassan (2014) has argued, on theoretical grounds, that the semantic and auditory-
phonological components of inner speech cannot be “attached” to each other in any literal sense, 
and that this has implications for the kinds of cognitive roles that inner speech might serve (see 
below, on metacognition).  The gist of this argument is that mental representations are individuated 
by the information they carry, or by what they represent; if an inner speech utterance of the word 
‘cow’ both represents cows and the sound of the English word ‘cow’, then there must be two 
distinct representations at work, and not just one.  Bermúdez (2018) responds to Langland-Hassan’s 
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arguments in defence of the view that an inner speech episode can be a single mental state that 
incorporates semantic and auditory-phonological components simultaneously, both as essential 
features.  Another option in this vicinity is to hold that ‘inner speech’ can mark an auditory or 
articulatory component in some cases, and, in others, a non-sensory and non-articulatory 
component; Oppenheim and Dell’s (2010) “flexible abstraction hypothesis” has this flavour.   
Researchers in psychology and neuroscience have in general placed less emphasis on the question of 
which components of inner speech qualify as inner speech proper, or which occur consciously, 
seeking instead to map out in cognitive wiring diagrams the different components of inner speech 
and their interrelations.  Such diagrams typically include, at a minimum, discrete stages for 
conceptualization (where a pre-verbal “message” is generated), formulation (where relevant 
phonemic features and a syntactic “frame” are selected), and articulatory planning (where motor 
instructions are selected and triggered) (Grandchamp et al., 2019; Levelt, 1989; Loevenbruck et al., 
2018).  In addition, researchers have attempted to place the components of inner speech within a 
larger cognitive architecture for motor control—one featuring components such as efference copies, 
forward models, and comparators (Pickering & Garrod, 2013).  These constructs are familiar to 
theories on which ordinary perception and action involves a continuous prediction of sensory input, 
based on motor commands, and a comparison of actual sensory feedback to the prediction 
(Jeannerod, 1995; Miall, Weir, Wolpert, & Stein, 1993; Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998).  Where 
mismatches (or “errors”) are detected, the system is alerted to make adjustments.  Pickering and 
Garrod (2013) have proposed that inner speech can be viewed as the sensory output of a forward 
model that serves as a prediction of the sensory input corresponding to planned overt utterances.  
On this sort of view, inner speech occurs as part of the monitoring of overt speech; what we 
experience as inner speech—in the absence of overt speech—is simply this capacity for overt speech 
prediction run “offline.”   
A challenge for the view of inner speech as a forward model, noted by Oppenheim (2013), is to 
explain how errors are detected in inner speech itself.  Oppenheim and Dell (2008) have found that 
participants report errors in their own inner speech when asked to repeat “tongue-twisters” silently, 
in the head.  On the basis of the kinds of errors they report, and the differences between those 
errors and the errors observed in overt speech, Oppenheim and Dell conclude that inner speech is 
phonetically “impoverished” compared to overt speech, occurring at a more “abstract” level of 
language processing (i.e. before full phonemic features are selected corresponding to the desired 
message).  A number of theorists have attempted to explain how errors could be detected in inner 
speech, while still viewing inner speech part of a larger prediction-comparison architecture for 
motor control, by positing multiple stages at which the components of inner speech are predicted 
and compared to internally generated results (Grandchamp et al., 2019; Vicente & Jorba, 2019).  
5.  INNER SPEECH’S PLACE IN THE BRAIN 
Inner speech’s neural substrates are increasingly well understood, with the proviso that proposals 
are inevitably attached to assumptions concerning which tasks or behaviours elicit or exploit inner 
speech proper (see Geva (2018a) for a review).  As we will see, language production areas, such as 
the left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG), are the most significantly activated during inner speech, though, 
in some conditions, there is significant activation of language-perception areas (such as the superior 
temporal gyrus (STG)) as well (Tian & Poeppel, 2010).  Some of the earliest PET and fMRI imaging 
work on inner speech explored differences in neural activation between an inner speech condition—
where subjects were asked to silently produce simple phrases in the head, incorporating specific 
words—and an imagining hearing speech condition, where subjects were asked to imagine hearing 
someone else say particular phrases (P. K. McGuire et al., 1996a; Shergill et al., 2001).   McGuire et 
al.’s (1996) results showed activation in the lIFG in both conditions, and added activations during the 
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“imagining another’s speech” condition in the left premotor cortex, supplementary motor area, and 
left temporal cortex.  Shergill et al.’s (2001) results were broadly consistent with these.  Much of this 
work has been conducted in the process of comparing the neural activations of healthy controls to 
those of people suffering from auditory verbal hallucinations, with each group being asked to 
generate inner speech and auditory verbal imagery of various kinds (Allen, Aleman, & McGuire, 
2007; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007b; P K McGuire et al., 1996; Shergill, 2003). 
Other imaging studies have used silent rhyme judgments, of the sort described above, as a means 
for eliciting inner speech.  In a typical study of this kind, participants are asked to press a button to 
indicate whether a pair of presented words rhyme, while neuroimagining (typically fMRI) occurs.  In 
a similar paradigm, Kell et al. (2017) used fMRI to investigate the neural correlates of silent reading, 
finding strong bilateral similarities to those of reading aloud and evidence that inner speech during 
reading codes detail as fine-grained as consonant voicing.  Working with patients preparing for 
surgery for intractable epilepsy, experimenters have taken recordings directly from the surface of 
the brain (electrocorticograpy) to assess the neural correlates of silently voicing words (Martin et al., 
2014; Martin, Iturrate, Millán, Knight, & Pasley, 2018; Pei et al., 2011). Across a number of such 
studies, the areas most commonly implicated remain the lIFG and areas thought to be involved in 
phonological assembly and processing, such as the supramarginal gyrus (Kell et al., 2017; Owen, 
Borowsky, & Sarty, 2004; Pei et al., 2011; Poldrack et al., 2001; Pugh et al., 1996; Tian & Poeppel, 
2010).  Geva et al. (2011b) found compatible evidence on a population with post-stroke aphasia; 
lesions to the left inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis (Brodmann Area 44) and its adjacent white 
matter (the arcuate fasciculus) were predictive of performance on silent rhyming tasks.   
As noted, theories concerning the neural substrates of inner speech are tied to assumptions about 
the kinds of tasks that elicit inner speech.  While many of the above studies have focused on 
“monologic” inner speech—where one simply speaks or repeats single words or phrases—some 
have emphasized the need to explore the neural correlates of “dialogic” inner speech, where 
participants are asked to imagine a conversation among multiple parties (Alderson-Day et al., 2016).  
It has been argued that such studies have greater ecological validity, insofar as a central role for 
inner speech in everyday life is negotiating interpersonal dynamics (Fernyhough, 2013).  (Though see 
Gregory (2017) for an argument that inner speech is not by nature dialogic.)  Alderson-Day et al. 
(2016) found that, in contrast to monologic inner speech, dialogic inner speech conditions activated 
the superior temporal gyrus (STG) bilaterally, the left inferior and medial frontal gyri, and various 
posterior midline structures.  Unlike monologic inner speech, the extended networks activated 
during dialogic inner speech showed significant overlap with networks activated during Theory of 
Mind tasks (including the right posterior STG), suggesting that dialogic inner speech has a closer 
connection to social cognition than the monologic inner speech explored in most other imaging 
studies.   
In another attempt to increase the ecological validity of inner speech neuroimaging, Hurlburt et al. 
(2016a) compared activation during traditional elicited (monologic) inner speech tasks to that during 
“spontaneously” generated inner speech (i.e. inner speech generated without an explicit prompt).  
They were able to measure the latter by first training participants in the Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES) paradigm described above.  Participants then heard beeps at random intervals while 
being scanned and indicated the instances when they had been engaged in inner speech just prior to 
the beep.  This allowed the neuroimaging recording at those moments to be compared to that 
recorded during elicited tasks.  The experimenters found distinct neural signatures associated with 
elicited versus spontaneous inner speech, with elicited inner speech decreasing activation in Heschl’s 
gyrus and increasing activation in the lIFG, while spontaneous inner speech showed increased 
activation in Heschl’s gyrus and no significant effect in the lIFG.  Such results raise the possibility that 
what is studied in traditional elicited inner speech neuroimagining studies is a somewhat distinct 
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phenomenon from the voice in the head familiar to everyday experience.  The matter remains 
unsettled, however, as Grandchamp et al. (2019) failed to find the same differential relation 
between lIFG and auditory cortex in spontaneous versus elicited inner speech. 
6. THE FUNCTIONS OF INNER SPEECH 
However common inner speech may be to everyday experience, the answer to why it is that we 
engage in inner speech is less clear.  One way to focus attention on the question of inner speech’s 
function is to ask how our lives would be different if we were no longer able to generate inner 
speech.  Aside from the obvious—such as that we could no longer plan just what to say—which 
cognitive tasks would become more difficult, or impossible?  Further, how would our awareness of 
our own thoughts change?  Would we be in a  situation where we could still think all the thoughts 
we used to think, while not being able to find the words with which to express them (even “in the 
head”)?  Or would it be better described as a situation where we simply could not think some of the 
thoughts we used to think?  These questions all concern the various cognitive—and metacognitive—
functions inner speech might play (see also Alderson-Day and Fernyhough (2015)). 
One of the most well-known and widely researched roles for inner speech is in maintaining 
information in working (or “short term”) memory.  Early research on working memory found that 
the phonemic features of words, together with word length, influence how easily they are 
remembered, with lists of phonetically similar words being more difficult to remember than 
phonetically-dissimilar words (Baddeley, 1966a, 1966b).  This result meshes with the intuitive datum 
that, when presented with a list of words to remember, we repeat them in inner speech, and that 
such inner speech has auditory-phonological features.  Baddeley and Hitch (1974) posited a 
“phonological loop” as a sub-component of a larger working memory system, through which verbal 
material could be kept cognitively available (Baddeley, 1992, 2007).  Predictably, people with 
aphasia—unable to easily produce language, usually as a result of stroke—have corresponding 
working memory deficits (Caspari, Parkinson, LaPointe, & Katz, 1998; Friedmann & Gvion, 2003).  
However, it has been noted that, if working memory is required for language comprehension and 
production (e.g. in resolving contextual ambiguity, or planning speech), then language could be 
impaired due to a general working memory deficit, and not the other way around (Wright & Shisler, 
2005).  Thus, the relation of inner speech to working memory—and the dependency on one of the 
other—remains an open research question. 
Inner speech has also been identified as a resource supporting executive function, most prominently 
in tasks that require switching between different responses and rules (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 
2001; Cragg & Nation, 2010; Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn, 2004).  Such studies often exploit a 
dual task structure involving articulatory suppression—a method common to experiments seeking to 
identify a linguistic contribution to task performance.  Participants are asked to engage in a simple 
linguistic task assumed to tax the language system, such as repeating a string of words, or repeating 
back recently heard sentences or words, while concurrently completing another task, such as sorting 
according to a rule.  In a control condition, participants complete the same sorting task while 
concurrently completing non-linguistic distractor task thought to impose a comparable cognitive 
load to the linguistic distractor task in the other condition (Alloway, Kerr, & Langheinrich, 2010; 
Saeki & Saito, 2004).  Decreased performance in the linguistic interference task is thought to result 
from the inability to draw on inner speech as a resource.  Closely related to executive function are 
processes supporting planning, problem solving, delay of gratification, and other forms of self-
regulation.  Here, too, inner speech has been argued to play a role.  Barkley (1997) proposes that 
delays in the development of self-directed speech may be partly to blame for problems with self-
regulation seen in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  More generally, (and as discussed 
by Petrolini, Vicente, and Jorba (in draft)), cognitive-behavioural therapies employing forms of 
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structured “self-talk” have been relatively successful in supporting controlled behaviour 
(Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971; Miranda, Presentación, Siegenthaler, & Jara, 2011).  It is natural 
to infer from the efficacy of self-directed outer speech that inner speech often plays the same 
supporting role.  The role of inner speech executive function and self-regulation remain open and 
contentious areas of research, however, in part due to a lack of uniformity in how each of these 
notions—viz., ‘executive function’, ‘self-regulation’, and ‘inner speech’—are understood by 
researchers (Petrolini, Vicente, & Jorba, in draft). 
Without diminishing the importance of the above results, one might ask whether inner speech also 
supports cognition in some less peripheral way—serving, for instance, as a medium for conceptual 
or “abstract” thought itself, and not merely as a cognitive aid to memory or executive function.  
While the hypothesis that inner speech serves as the primary medium for conceptual thought or 
reasoning in general has had advocates over the years (Frankish, 2018; Gauker, 2011; Paivio, 1971) 
experimental support for its serving as a necessary resource for such remains slight.  The evident 
capacities for complex cognition shown by non-human animals, pre-linguistic humans, and language-
impaired humans all speak against the strong hypothesis that conceptual thought—however it is to 
be understood—requires the active use of inner (or outer) speech.  Nevertheless, there is increasing 
support for the idea that abstract thought—defined as thought about objects or properties not 
easily perceived—is supported by language, and by inner speech in particular (Borghi et al., 2017; 
Dove, 2014; Gentner & Boroditsky, 2001; Lupyan & Bergen, 2016).  Researchers working within the 
embodied cognition tradition, in particular, have seen language perception and production—and its 
internalization of each, via inner speech—as a resource for explaining the human ability to form and 
make use of abstract concepts in broadly sensorimotor terms (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 
2008; Dove, 2018, 2019).   
Of course, human thought—even “abstract thought”—is not a monolith but a constellation of 
distinct and mutually-supporting cognitive capacities; there is reason to see inner speech as just one 
resource in that larger group (Lupyan & Bergen, 2016).  It has been proposed that inner speech 
serves as a means for integrating information across distinct cognitive modules (Carruthers, 2002); 
and there is evidence from experiments employing verbal shadowing that suppressing inner speech 
interferes with the ability to integrate shape and colour information (Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, & 
Katsnelson, 1999).  An alternative proposal, with support from verbal interference studies and 
studies with people with aphasia, is that inner speech serves as an aid to fixing attention on a 
particular feature shared by multiple items—such as colour—when they have little else in common 
(Lupyan, 2009; Lupyan & Mirman, 2013).  More generally, psychologists have emphasized the 
capacity for inner speech to serve as a kind of “control system” or tool for augmenting and 
manipulating non-verbal thought, without language or inner speech itself constituting a 
representational medium for thought (Roebuck & Lupyan, 2020).  
A possibility that has interested empirically-oriented philosophers, in particular, is that inner speech 
might constitute the central means by which people become conscious of (or, alternatively, gain 
metacognitive awareness or) their own thoughts (Clark, 1998; Frankish, 2004; Langland-Hassan, 
2014; Machery, 2018; Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010; Morin, 2005).  This thesis is typically 
defended with respect to a certain sub-class of thought—such as conceptual or “propositional” 
thoughts of the sort neatly expressible in language (Bermudez, 2003, 2018; Carruthers, 2011; 
Machery, 2018).  The idea here is that, while inner speech may not be necessary simply for having 
thoughts of a particular kind, it is the primary means by which we are able to internally reflect 
upon—and become conscious of—those thoughts.  This awareness is hypothesized to allow for 
reflection upon the logical or inferential properties that hold among thoughts (Bermudez, 2003; 
Clark, 1998), or to serve as data for feats of self-interpretation about one’s other mental states 
(Carruthers, 2011; Gregory, 2018).  Empirical support for these theoretical proposals remains 
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relatively indirect (see Carruthers (2011) and Morin (2018) for reviews).  However, in one recent 
study, people with aphasia—who were determined, through a silent rhyming task, to have inner 
speech deficits—were found to be unreliable (compared to controls) in their metacognitive 
judgments concerning whether they had correctly categorized objects by an abstract commonality, 
such as being energy sources, or being alive (Langland-Hassan, Gauker, Richardson, Dietz, & Faries, 
2017).  The subjects with aphasia did not show comparable deficits in the categorizations 
themselves, insofar as they were able to correctly identify which objects go together as reliably as 
controls. For this reason, the experimenters concluded that inner speech plays a distinctively 
metacognitive role. 
Scientifically assessing whether inner speech plays an important role in metacognition—or in making 
one conscious of one’s own thoughts—remains challenging due to the general difficulty in assessing 
when people are or are not aware of their own thoughts.  More powerful and more creative 
experimental paradigms are still needed.  
7. INNER SPEECH AND AUDITORY VERBAL HALLUCINATIONS 
A common symptom of psychosis is the experience of “hearing voices,” or auditory verbal 
hallucinations (AVHs).  A hotly debated question in the cognitive science of inner speech is how to 
understand the role of inner speech in the generation of AVHs.  One way to think about AVHs is that 
the person experiencing them is generating episodes of inner speech without realizing that they are 
doing so.  A number of competing theories have been developed to explain how it is that patients 
create complex inner utterances without feeling as though they are doing so. 
Before looking more closely at some of those proposals, it is worth considering a more 
straightforward hypothesis.  Instead of conceiving of AVHs as episodes of inner speech that, 
somehow, are misidentified as being created by someone else, one might alternatively view them as 
fundamentally perceptual in nature—as cases of having a perceptual experience just as if someone 
else is speaking, caused by spontaneous (pathological) activation of speech perception areas of the 
brain, when, in fact, no one is speaking (Wu, 2012; Wu & Cho, 2014)?  After all, if AVHs are more like 
receiving speech than producing speech, we have a more straightforward explanation for why 
patients do not take themselves to be the agents responsible for the episodes.  While this may 
indeed be a plausible account of some episodes that are reported as AVHs, researchers have largely 
pursued other possibilities, for several reasons.  One traces to patient reports themselves:  it is 
common in surveys concerning the characteristics of AVHs for patients to report hearing voices that 
are not subjectively “loud” or rich in sensory features (Graham & Stephens, 2000; Hoffman, Varanko, 
Gilmore, & Mishara, 2008; Laroi et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996).  Many AVHs are described by 
patients as being more like their own “verbal thought” (Hoffman et al., 2008) or even as “soundless” 
(Junginger & Frame, 1985).  This gives some reason to pursue a single style of explanation that will 
account for the fact that patients do not feel in control of their AVHs in both these cases and those 
that present with stronger perceptual qualities (Langland-Hassan, 2008, 2016).   
A second reason is that neuroimaging shows language production areas are indeed triggered during 
AVHs, in addition to language perception areas (Allen et al., 2007; Allen et al., 2012; Bohlken, 
Hugdahl, & Sommer, 2016).  This suggests that AVHs are not a purely perceptual phenomenon and 
that language episodes are indeed being formulated by the patient’s language-production 
mechanisms without the patient having the sense that he or she is doing so.  Simply conceiving AVHs 
as akin to hearing speech without an actual speaker overlooks this constitutive role of the language 
production system in their genesis.  Though it bears noting that ordinary language perception 
involves some activation of language-production areas as well.  In any case, a powerful confirmation 
of whether AVHs are an inherently productive phenomenon, as opposed to primarily perceptual, 
would be to assess whether a patient with intractable AVHs experiences a significant decrease in 
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their AVHs after suffering a stroke and acquiring a non-fluent (i.e. productive) form of aphasia, such 
as Broca’s or anomic aphasia.  We know of no published reports of this combination of conditions. 
The most common style of cognitive explanation for AVHs, pioneered by Christopher Frith (1992),  
sees AVHs as just one in a constellation of passivity symptoms experienced by people with 
schizophrenia (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 2000; Spence et al., 1997).   “Passivity” 
symptoms are disruptions in one’s sense of being the agent responsible for an action or, in the 
present case, mental episode.  Many of these theories draw on the prediction-comparison 
framework described above, originally developed by theories of motor control to explain how bodily 
movements are self-monitored and corrected (Miall et al., 1993; Wolpert et al., 1998).  The general 
idea behind these “comparator” approaches is that if an episode of inner speech is not appropriately 
predicted by internal monitoring mechanisms, it will be experienced as resulting from some agency 
other than one’s own—and that this is the case regardless of the subjective “loudness” of the 
experience, and regardless of whether the voice seems to come from inside or outside the head.  
Neuroimaging evidence has been provided in validation of some of the theoretical posits of these 
models, such as the idea that inner speech involves the generation of a sensory prediction that is 
also generated during overt speech production (Tian & Poeppel, 2010, 2012).  Such models continue 
to be developed and expanded (Grandchamp et al., 2019).  
 Some, including Frith himself (2012), have argued that this comparator-style of explanation, as 
applied to AHVs, has considerable limitations, or is altogether misguided (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008; Vicente, 2014; Wilkinson, 2014a; Wu, 2012).  Others have responded that, suitably 
amended, something like the comparator hypothesis can indeed be extended to explain AVHs and 
possibly related phenomena as well, including the experience of “thought insertion” (Ford & 
Mathalon, 2005; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a; Langland-Hassan, 2008; Loevenbruck et al., 2018; 
Stephan, Friston, & Frith, 2009; Swiney, 2018; Swiney & Sousa, 2014).  These debates remain active 
and unsettled.  Neuroimaging of patients experiencing AVH shows activation both in speech 
production and speech perception areas, and, taken as a whole, is equivocal with respect to most 
theories of the finer-grained cognitive bases of AVH (see Allen et al. (2007) and Bohlken et al. (2016) 
for reviews; see also Anthony (2004)). Recently, a number of theorists have moved forward from 
traditional comparator models to try to understand AVH in similar ways via the use of predictive 
processing models of cognition (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Swiney, 2018; Wilkinson, 2014b; Wilkinson & 
Fernyhough, 2017). 
A lingering challenge for all of these approaches is to explain the possibility of comprehensible dialog 
between patients and their AVHs, which has been reported in a number of cases (Langdon, Jones, 
Connaughton, & Fernyhough, 2009; Wu & Cho, 2013).  Whether we view AVHs as resulting from 
breakdowns in self-monitoring, or as spontaneous episodes of activation in auditory cortex, it is not 
immediately evident why such breakdowns would be timed in such a way as to allow for a 
comprehensible give-and-take discussion between the patient and his or her “voices.”  
8.  NEW DIRECTIONS  
As earlier noted, an important feature of inner speech—one that distinguishes it, as a psychological 
phenomenon, from neurocognitive language-processing in general—is its familiarity to first person 
experience and its resulting susceptibility to conscious control.  We know how to generate detailed 
linguistic utterances “in our heads,” and this unremarkable fact becomes a powerful tool when 
paired with technologies for detecting and transcribing inner utterances on the basis of neural or 
other bodily indices.  For instance, Kapur et al. (2018) created a wearable interface that detects 
neuromuscular signals in the jaw and throat that are generated when people silently voice words 
and phrases in inner speech.  Through machine learning, they trained an artificial neural network to 
translate this neuromuscular information back into matching linguistic items (see also Meltzner et al. 
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(2008) for similar results). This allows wearers of the device to send their inner speech utterances 
electronically to a computer interface or other user, enabling a new form of silent communication 
(with 92% mean accuracy on digit recognition tasks—despite no discernible mouth movements on 
the part of the user).  Applications include sending messages when speaking aloud or typing is not 
possible (e.g. during military or law enforcement operations), interacting seamlessly with smart 
devices, and communicating with other language users in noisy environments.  One can also imagine 
therapeutic applications, including facilitating speech for people with mouth, tongue, or vocal cord 
abnormalities, and experimental interventions on people suffering from AVHs.  Perhaps if one’s 
AVHs were projected aloud by such a device, this would facilitate great control of AVHs by the 
patient, and greater insight into their aetiology. 
In a related line of research, Anumanchipalli et al. (2019) used machine learning to develop a “neural 
speech prosthetic” capable of directly translating inner speech-related neural activity to written 
text., or synthesized speech through a speaker (see also Martin et al. (2018) for related research).  
The researchers used electrocorticography (ECoG) to take direct neural readings from five 
participants undergoing intracranial monitoring for epilepsy treatment.  Readings were taken from 
the ventral sensorimotor cortex (vSMC), superior temporal gyrus, and the inferior frontal gyrus, 
while participants spoke hundreds of sentences aloud.  Recurrent artificial neural networks were 
then trained on these readings to associate the neural activity with specific word sounds, such that 
the network could later be used to generate the word sounds itself, given the same set of neural 
readings as input.  The experimenters further demonstrated that the network could, with some 
reliability, generate words and phrases from neural activity that occurred when sentences were 
simply “mimed” (where “miming” involves making the relevant mouth movements for saying a 
phrase, but without producing sound).  Of note is the high reliance that the network placed on 
detecting patterns in the neural representation of “speech kinematics” and articulatory plans (pp. 
494-6).  While obviously more invasive than the device developed by Kapur et al., this technology 
looks to be an important stepping-stone on the way to restoring speech for patients with paralysis.   
Conclusion 
Researchers are drawn to inner speech for many reasons.  Some see in it the key to grasping the 
relationship of abstract thought to language.  Others emphasize its importance as a support to more 
general cognitive capacities, such as metacognition, memory, and executive function.  Still others 
hope that better grasping the cognitive architecture and neural substrates of inner speech will shed 
light on and facilitate intervention upon auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia.  Researchers 
in neuroscience are now learning to exploit inner speech, through its neural and neuromuscular 
signatures, as a means to creating new forms of communication that may be of aid to populations 
with disabilities. 
Theories of the components and stages of inner speech have grown more detailed in recent years 
and are now supported by concurrent work in neuroimaging.  Substantive theoretical questions 
remain open, including which components of inner speech can occur in isolation, whether there are 
importantly different forms of inner speech, which experimental tasks are best suited for eliciting 
inner speech, and how our scientific understanding of inner speech can be further leveraged to 
improve lives.  While there remains open texture in the definition of what constitutes inner speech, 
this has not impeded scientific progress and is to be expected as we achieve a more detailed image 
of little voice in the head.   
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